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Truth in Government:
Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget
by
JULIE RoIN*

"[T]he Administration believes that tthe concept of 'tax
expenditure' is of questionable analytic value."
President Bush sparked a minor firestorm within the Beltway by
including these words in his fiscal 2002 budget analysis.2 This was not
because the tax expenditure budget-which sets out the implicit cost
of various deductions and provisions of the tax code-was viewed as
beyond criticism. Various aspects of the tax expenditure budget have
been attacked since its inception, and the particular objection raised
by the 2002 budget document-the absence of a normative baseline
for determining what constitutes a tax expenditures'-was among the
earliest to surface.' Rather, it was the language of the attack that
seemed remarkable. It sounded to many like the opening salvo in a

* Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I would like
to express my thanks to those who commented on prior drafts of this Article: Saul
Levmore and participants in the Harvard Law School's Seminar on Current Research in
Taxation, the University of Illinois College of Law faculty workshop, the NYU
Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, and the University of Michigan Law School
Law and Economics Workshop. Thanks are also due to the Sarah Scaife Foundation and
the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for their financial support.
1. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
U.S., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 61 (2001) [hereinafter 2002 BUDGET].
2. See Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value of Tax Expenditures List,
91 TAX NOTES 535, 535 (2001); Martin A. Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle
Over Tax Expenditures, 91 TAX NOTES 701, 701 (2001) ("[T]he text of the Bush budget
jolted tax policy aficionados to attention .....
3. 2002 BUDGET, supra note 1, at 61.
4. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 TAX
NOTES 413, 414-17 (2001) (recounting a history of disputes over the existence and
meaning of baseline); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
NationalBudget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244, 247 (1969); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman,
Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1661 (1992); Victor
Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1166-67.
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battle to overturn the Congressional requirement that such a budget
be constructed and published as part of the annual budget
Public evidence of this battle remains scarce. Indeed, the
language contained in the following year's budget seems to back away
from the prior year's blanket condemnation of the tax expenditure
budget. The 2003 budget states merely that "the Administration
believes the meaningfulness of tax expenditure estimates is uncertain
and that the 'tax expenditure' presentation can be improved by
consideration of alternative or additional tax bases., 6 Yet, it is hard
to believe that the 2002 budget language was an error, or a
misrepresentation of the Administration's feelings towards the tax
expenditure budget.
A substantial faction probably favors its
elimination, which means the issue will probably resurface in the notvery-distant future,7 and when it does, we should be prepared to
discuss the relevant issues.
Those issues include both those raised by the President and
others that are routinely ignored. The most important is that all the
sources of information we have about government spending suffer
from problems similar if not identical to those identified in the tax
expenditure budget. Take, for example, the absence of an agreedupon baseline of a "normal" tax system against which to measure "tax
expenditures." A central theme of the Article is that the same
baseline problem exists for several clear substitutes for tax
expenditures, regulation and the non-enforcement of across-theboard rules.
Even the seemingly obvious baseline of zero
expenditures for determining the amount of cash subsidies can be
challenged as incompletely theorized and misleading. The breadth
and depth of the baseline and other problems throw into question the
wisdom of excoriating the tax expenditure budget in particular. If
improving the utility of information distributed about the direction
and function of government is the desired end, one must focus at least
as much on the interaction between the various information sources
as on the merits or demerits of any particular source of information.
And once we do that, this Article argues, it becomes clear that the
better path involves the publication of more, rather than less,
information. In particular, the Article contends that it would be
helpful to publish an admittedly flawed regulatory budget to serve as
a companion to the tax expenditure budget as part of the annual
budget process.
5. See Bartlett, supra note 4, at 413; Glenn, supra note 2, at 535.

6. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
U.S., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 95 (2002) [hereinafter 2003 BUDGET].
7. The public silence may indicate only that the battleground has shifted to behind
the closed doors of the Congressional budget committees.
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I. Introduction: The Importance of Information in a
Democratic Society
Though reasonable people disagree about precisely which policy
initiatives constitute "rent-seeking" (as opposed to "good public
policy"), all agree that in theory, government can be misused to
extract money from a poorly-organized majority and to redistribute it
to an undeserving but well-organized minority.' In addition to the
implicit unfairness of such activity, this raises serious efficiency
concerns. Not only do groups waste their time and energy seeking (or
opposing) such redistribution,' but the method of redistribution may
induce additional undesirable behavior." Price-support programs
may lead farmers to plant covered crops rather than others that can
be sold at a profit on the open market; "favorable" regulation may
cause utility companies to continue to utilize out-dated, pollutionspewing equipment rather than invest in newer and cleaner
technology.
Some amount of rent-seeking" is endemic to all societies and all
political systems,'2 and perhaps to all human relationships. 3
8. This insight underlies the school of thought known as "public choice theory." See
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 283-85
(Liberty Fund, Inc., 1999) (1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 35 (1965). For a summary of
the literature on interest group theory, see, for example, Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35 (1991); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public
Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36-45 (1990). The intellectual lineage of
public choice theory stretches at least as far back as James Madison. Edward A. Zelinsky,
James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1171 (1993).
9. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 229-35 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1989); James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of
Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3,
22-23 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Elhauge, supra note 8, at 43:
Shaviro, supra note 8, at 38.
10. See GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT
SEEKING 19 (1989); Shaviro, supra note 8, at 42-44.
11. As the previous paragraph illustrates, the term "rent-seeking" is used to describe
two quite different types of socially destructive behavior. One use of the term refers to
attempts to extract personal gain at the expense of the larger society. See Gordon Tullock,
Rent Seeking and Tax Reform, 6 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 37, 37 (1988) ("My personal
definition of rent seeking essentially is using resources to obtain rents for people where
the rents themselves come from something with negative social value."). This use of the
term is associated with concepts such as negative "log-rolling," see BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 142-45, where each interest group constituency receives a
share of governmental largesse, but each ends up "worse off than if there had been no
largesse at all," see Shaviro, supra note 8,at 37, and "collective action problems," where a

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

However, most people also believe that steps can be taken to
minimize its amount. Political systems and institutions can be
designed to reduce the rewards from rent-seeking behavior, thereby
reducing the resources invested in this unproductive endeavor and
correspondingly increasing the resources devoted to productive
enterprises.'4 A legal system sensitive to public choice concerns must
identify these arrangements and institutions.
In democratic systems, rent-seeking is partly a function of agency
problems, arising from the public's lax monitoring of its agents.
These agents include both the politicians responsible for generating
laws and the bureaucrats entrusted with their administration and
enforcement. In less technical terms, this means that politicians and
bureaucrats cater to special interests because the public fails to punish
them for doing so-by throwing them out of office' 6-often enough.
Many explanations exist for the public's failure to punish offending
politicians. Some believe that the problem consists of a lack of easily

combination of free-riding and organizational disparities allow small, concentrated groups
to take advantage of more diffuse majorities. See Elhauge, supra note 8, at 37-39. "Rentseeking" can also refer to attempts to appropriate (through the political system or
otherwise) gains generated by beneficial transactions. The resources expended in such
efforts to achieve such transfers of wealth are "wasted," thus offsetting the gains (or
consumer surplus) generated by the underlying transaction. See Shaviro, supra note 8, at
38. This Article considers both forms of misbehavior to be "rent-seeking."
12. Although the public choice literature focuses on rent-seeking in representative
democracies, this is a function of the context within which such scholars are working.
Similar analytic methods could no doubt be employed to explain the rise and fall of court
"favorites" and other phenomenon in autocratic regimes.
13. A number of academics analyze employment relationships and labor laws in terms
of "rent-seeking" opportunities. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining
Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial
Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 491 (1992); Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital
and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 97 (1981). Others have looked at
marriage and divorce through the same lens. See Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency:
The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justificationfor Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2423, 2440 (1994).
14. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 287-93; Elhauge, supra note 8,
at 44-46 (summarizing proposals for using judicial review as counterbalance to interest
group capture); Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1172-73 (outlining Madisonian solution);
Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1173 (summarizing "contemporary agency scholarship").
15. See Shaviro, supra note 8, at 39-40 (describing "efficient shirking" by voters).
16. Politicians can be directly voted out of office. Punishing bureaucrats is more
difficult, especially when they are protected by civil service regulations. However, many
of the top-level bureaucrats are political appointees. Those who serve under them can be
fired (even under civil service regulations) for insubordination should they fail to abide by
the policies set by their department heads; as a practical matter, though, it may be difficult
to differentiate between active disobedience and less-than-stellar (but not dischargeworthy) performance.
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accessible and comprehensible information.17

The public would

punish politicians more if they knew the extent of their
transgressions, just as they take action against corporations once they
have been revealed to be major polluters.'8 This belief has led to calls
for the provision of better, more accessible information about the
actions of government officials."
Of course, the public provision of information about
governmental behavior serves a broader purpose in democratic
societies than the control of rent-seeking behavior. Governance often
requires establishing priorities, making hard decisions based on
incomplete information, or choosing between competing values.
Voters need to know whether the actions taken by their government
accord with their personal beliefs and preferences" to intelligently
choose between returning incumbents to political office or seeking
new alternatives.
Finally, information about past and current government
programs can help government officials make better decisions. It
helps avoid the creation of duplicative programs, and can provide
17. One prominent public choice theorist explains that because interest groups realize
that a direct transfer of public monies to their group would be too "raw," they try to
conceal what is really going on from the public at large. See TULLOCK, supra note 10, at
19.
18. The Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI"), section 313 of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2002), has been acclaimed as
one of the most successful anti-pollution laws in recent history. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 956 (2002) (describing TRI as "a
smashing policy success"). By requiring facilities in specified industrial sectors to file
annual disclosures of their releases of some 650 listed toxic substances, "[i]t subjects the
environmental performance of facilities and firms to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny
by their peers, competitors, investors, employees, consumers, community residents... and
the public in general .... These external monitors often have powerful tools at their
disposal ... which they use to discipline poor performers." Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 261-62 (2001). This law has been
credited with "dramatic reductions" in reported releases. Id. at 259.
19. See, e.g., Kirk D. Jensen, The Reasonable Government Official Test: A Proposal
for the Treatment of Factual Information Under the Federal Deliberative Process Privilege,
49 DUKE L.J. 561, 563 (1999) (arguing for the disclosure of factual information provided
government agencies during the deliberative process); Marcy Lynn Karin, Out of Sight,
but Not Out of Mind: How Executive Order 1.3,233 Expands Executive Privilege While
Simultaneously Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV. 529, 570
(2002) (arguing against attempted expansion of executive privilege); William F. Pedersen,
Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 151, 183 (2001) (advocating "social cost disclosure" as a cure for passive agency
behavior).
20. Opponents often describe decisions that they disagree with as "rent-seeking" or
interest group "grabs" whether or not they meet the technical definition of "rent-seeking."
See souces cited supra note 11.
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general information regarding the financial or other consequences of
particular government actions.
II. The Tax Expenditure Budget as a Provider of Information
A. The History of the Tax Expenditure Budget
The tax expenditure budget was developed as just such an
informational aid. In the late 1960's, Stanley Surrey developed a
theory that "special" tax rules which reduced tax liability had the
same economic and social effects as direct government expenditures,
and should be analyzed accordingly for economic and political
purposes."
He pioneered the concept of the "tax expenditure
budget" to catalogue both such provisions and their cost in terms of
foregone tax revenue.22 The budget identifies "departures from the
normal tax structure" and estimates the revenue the government
would have collected in the absence of those provisions, and thus the
implicit cost of these provisions. When he became the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy during the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations, Surrey worked tirelessly to convince
Congress of the need to publish a tax expenditure budget as part of
the President's annual budget." These efforts did not come to
fruition until 1974, long after Surrey returned to his Harvard
professorship.24 Only then did Congress pass legislation mandating
2l. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 706 (1970);
see generally Jonathan Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX

NOTES 537, 538 (1986) ("Surrey gave the phrase 'tax expenditure' its first public exposure
on November 15, 1967 in ak [sic] speech to the Money Marketeers, a New York Financial
group."); Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1165 n.l (detailing Surrey's role). Living as he did in a
less cynical era, Surrey worried less about self-interested government actors than about
irrational or careless decisionmaking. Surrey believed that the use of tax expenditures
interfered with "the ability of the Government to maintain control over the management

of its priorities" by undercutting the budget process, see Surrey, supra, at 731-32, and
avoided the oversight of the "appropriate congressional committee charged with the
legislative area involved," id. at 728. He hoped that publication of a tax expenditure
budget would lead to the elimination of tax expenditures and their replacement (when
appropriate) with direct expenditure programs. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO
TAX REFORM 38-39 (1973); Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1155. The continued survival of

tax expenditures shows them to be more deeply-rooted-and more attributable to
deliberate political decisions than ignorant or careless governance-than Surrey initially

contended.
22. See Forman, supra note 21, at 538-39.

23. See id. at 540 ("Surrey devoted a great deal of effort to getting the Bureau of the
Budget to agree to include the tax expenditure analysis in the budget ....
").
24. Surrey earlier convinced the Secretary of the Treasury to include a tax expenditure
budget in his Annual Report. Id. at 541. The first tax expenditure budget appeared as an
appendix to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year 1968.
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the inclusion of a tax expenditure budget in the annual federal budget
report.25
Although this act requires a listing of "tax expenditures" in the

budget, it provides little in the way of guidance about either the form
or content of such a listing. As a result, the presentation of the tax
expenditure budget has varied over time. Initially, the budget was
compiled using "a practical variant of a comprehensive income tax"
as the baseline, or "normal tax," against which deviations were
measured.26 Beginning in 1983, however, the budget displayed tax
expenditures measured against a revised baseline, entitled the

"reference tax" in addition to the "normal tax" baseline.27 The
normal and reference tax baselines differ in their treatment of the
rate structure,"' government transfer payments," accelerated

See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY ON THE STATE OF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1968,

at 322-40 (1969). This practice, in modified form, survived the change of administrations
in 1970. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,

1970, at 306-08 (1970) (referencing a list of "tax aids"). The Ways and Means Committee
began printing Treasury/Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation estimates of
federal tax expenditures on an annual basis in 1972. Forman, supra note 21, at 542
(detailing legislative background). The Joint Committee continues to publish a list of tax
expenditures on an annual basis. The Joint Committee analysis of tax expenditures varies
in some respects from that produced by the Treasury for use in the Presidential budget
document. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-2004 (Joint Comm. Print 1999),

reprinted in 86 TAX NOTES 103, 107-09 (2000) (outlining differences between the tax
expenditure budgets).

25. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 mandated the preparation of an annual tax
expenditure budget. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-344, § 308, 88 Stat. 297, 313 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 639 (2002)).
See generally Bartlett, supra note 4, at 414 (detailing legislative history of tax expenditure
budget); Forman, supra note 21, at 542-44 (legislation sponsored by Senator Jacob K.
Javits).
26. ORG.

FOR ECON.

CO-OPERATION &

DEV., TAX EXPENDITURES:

RECENT

EXPERIENCES 108 (1996). Both the executive branch and congressional staffs agreed on a
common concept of a "normal tax" during this period. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDGET
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1985, at G-1 (1985) [hereinafter .1985
BUDGET].
27. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 26, at 107.

28. The normal tax baseline uses the maximum rate of corporate tax as its baseline,
treating the lower tax rate applied to the first $10 million of corporate income as a tax
expenditure, while the reference tax takes the entire tax schedule as a baseline. Similarly,
the reference tax does not treat the preferential tax rate for capital gains as a tax
expenditure. See 2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 112-13.
29. The normal tax baseline treats all cash transfers from the Government to

individuals as gross income, and exemptions of such transfers from the tax base as tax
expenditures. The reference baseline ignores these transfers. Id. at 113.
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depreciation, ' and some foreign income." The 1982 budget was the
first to add a table displaying the various tax expenditures in terms of
their "outlay equivalents"-or how much money the government
would have to transfer to get the same economic effect as the tax
expenditure.32 Beginning in 1995, the budget included a table
estimating the cost in present value terms of provisions leading to tax
deferrals (as opposed to total forgiveness).33
All of these changes were attempts to improve the quality of the
information provided by the tax expenditure budget. As detailed
below, however, many continue to attack imperfections in the tax
expenditure budget.
B. Continuing Questions About Quality
The quality of the information conveyed by the tax expenditure

budget has been subject to question from its inception. These
criticisms focused, and continue to focus on two issues. One is the
baseline issue, the question of what to consider as "normal" for
purposes of identifying and measuring deviations or "tax
expenditures." The other is simply the reliability of the numbers
associated with the identified expenditures.

These are not minor

quibbles whether one's aim is to identify legislative misbehavior in
catering to "special interests" or merely to learn how the government
has directed its limited resources. For both, one needs to know to
whom such largesse has been directed and in what amounts.
Unfortunately, the tax expenditure budget continues to fall short of
perfection on these measurement issues.
(1) The Baseline Issue

One of the earliest critics of the tax expenditure budget, Boris
Bittker, noted that,
[t]o effect a "full accounting", then, we must first construct an ideal
or correct income tax structure, departures from which will be
reflected as "tax expenditures" in the National Budget ....

30. The reference tax baseline, unlike the normal tax baseline, ignores accelerated
depreciation. /d.
31. The normal tax baseline treats the deferral of tax on income of controlled foreign
corporations as a tax expenditure while the reference tax baseline does not. Id.
32. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 26, at 108; 1985
BUDGET, supra note 26, at G-12. The amount differs from the tax expenditure amount
primarily because the government transfers would be subject to tax upon receipt. 1985
BUDGET, supra note 26, at G-12.
33. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 26, at 110.
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If the lack of an agreed conceptual model makes it impossible to
say whether a large number of structural features of the existing
federal income tax laws are, or are not, "tax expenditures," the
proposed "full accounting" may turn out, in the end, to be only a
partial accounting. In this event, it will succeed in bringing some
issues to the fore only to conceal others. . .. "

Bittker went on to detail a number of areas in which no "agreed
conceptual model" existed.35 Later critics have reiterated these
concerns, sometimes adding a political twist. Several have alleged
that Surrey's "subjective vision" implemented in the "normal tax"
baseline (and to a lesser extent the "reference tax" baseline) targets
those provisions aiding businesses and wealthier taxpayers while
overlooking those aspects of the tax system (such as the progressive
rate structure) that benefit lower-income individuals and others (such
as the corporate income tax) that target higher income taxpayers."
As implemented, the argument goes, the tax expenditure budget
(even as modified by the addition of the reference tax baseline)
incorporates a liberal agenda.3"
There is little doubt about the validity of these criticisms. The
tax expenditure budget, as currently constructed (and probably
however
constructed39 )
imperfectly
reflects
the
political
34. Bittker, supra note 4, at 248-59. See Forman, supra note 21, at 539 n.15 ("This
issue is central in the early debate over the validity of the tax expenditure concept.").
Even those relatively comfortable with Surrey's choice of a Haig-Simons income baseline
quarreled with his resolution of the ambiguities inherent in that concept as well as his
incorporation of generally accepted tax and accounting structures. See, e.g., DAVID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 263-64 (1986); Kahn & Lehman, supra
note 4, at 1663; Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1155 ("[Tihese compromises have made the
idea of a normative income tax so inherently subjective that it deprives the tax
expenditure concept of its persuasive force."); Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1167-70
(summarizing positions of critics).
35. Bittker, supra note 4, at 250-58.
36. See BRADFORD, supra note 34, at 263-64; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 4, at 1663;
Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1170.
37. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 4, at 419. Of course, if the corporate income tax is
considered a tax expenditure, one would have to reconsider treating the realization
requirement as one as well, since it allows shareholders to exclude (sometimes
permanently) the income generated from corporate investments from the shareholders'
income tax base. The two adjustments may come close to canceling each other out.
38. Id. at 421 (revision of tax expenditure budget would be a "threat to liberal
dominance of the tax reform debate"); see also Gene Steuerle, The New Old Tax
Expenditure Debate, 95 TAX NOTES 1671-72 (2002).
39. See Bittker, supra note 4, at 251 (a "full accounting" of departures from the HaigSimons model "would be a formidable undertaking"); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive
Income Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REV. 925, 929 (1967) (citing
Joseph A. Pechman, What Would a Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Yield?, in
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 251, 259 (Comm. Print 1959)) ("To determine
the extent of erosion, we must first have some notion as to what the tax system ought to
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considerations underlying the construction of the tax code. As such,

it provides an incomplete and inaccurate measure of special interest
influence that is full of oddities. For example, while the deduction for
charitable contributions is treated as a tax expenditure, the treatment
of some entities as tax-exempt is not." The implicit assumption that
all tax expenditures are bad4 1 can also be distracting. There is no
particular reason to believe that tax expenditures are any more likely

than direct expenditures to be the result of special interest pandering
rather than a legitimate mechanism for overcoming a collective action
problem.42

Nor is it clear,

as some have

suggested,4

that

Congressional decisionmaking would be improved by remitting
control over various tax expenditures to the Congressional
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the area affected.44 And at this
point, it is hard to argue, as Surrey did, that many of the provisions
resulted from Congressional failures to "[know] what was being spent
through the tax system or for what purposes ...[because] there was

no accounting" for them. It may well be time to rethink the way
some of the ambiguities in the Haig-Simons income concept are being
resolved and broaden (or shorten) the list of tax expenditures to
cover more (or less) than those Surrey would have preferred to
''move . . . -to
the extent that government assistance is still
considered desirable-from the tax expenditure budget to the regular
budget" in the form of direct expenditure programs.

be. Since this is to a large extent a matter of equity, and since equity judgments are highly
personal, no single standard will meet everybody's approval.").
40. This cannot be justified as a method of avoiding double-counting since many taxexempt organizations earn income as well as raise money through tax-exempt donations.
41. See Bittker, supra note 4, at 248 ("[I]t is not insignificant" that initial "minimum
lists" of tax expenditures seemed to be "limited to those provisions that the incumbent
Secretary of the Treasury wants Congress to repeal.").
42. Although critics of tax expenditures have long alleged that the tax system is more
susceptible to rent-seeking than direct expenditure programs, the one empirical study of
this issue suggests that little or no difference in results flow from admitted differences in
procedure. See Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1190-91.
43. See Surrey, supra note 21, at 728-29; Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1161.
44. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 402-04 (1998) (unifying budget by function
would generate timing mismatches).
45. See Surrey, supra note 21, at 730.

46. See id. at 737-38. Given the hybrid nature of the current tax system, it may be
sensible to publish an additional tax expenditure budget calculated in accordance with a
consumption tax (as opposed to income tax) baseline. Among other things, placing the

two budgets side-by-side would graphically demonstrate differences between the two
taxing systems. The possibility of such a move is more than hinted at in the just-released
2004 federal budget document. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED

STATES

GOVERNMENT,

FISCAL

YEAR

2004,

at

134-37

(2003)

(comparing

tax
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But the proper response to this criticism lies in a reexamination
of the list of tax expenditures, broadening and deepening the level of
public exposure, not scrapping the whole instrument. The criticism in
no way refutes the underlying insight that specially favorable tax rules
constitute a form of government subsidy or expenditure, nor suggests
that the information we have should be suppressed.
(2) The Numbers
The choice of the baseline affects the identification of tax
expenditures.
Some tax provisions that are treated as tax
expenditures under one baseline do not appear as tax expenditures
under another.47
Picking the "wrong" baseline can generate
misleading information. But voters and politicians also can be misled
if they believe that a particular tax expenditure is much more (or less)
costly than it actually is. And many suspect that the tax expenditure
budget, as currently formulated, makes many such errors, perhaps
enough to make the schedule worse than useless.
One problem flows from the lack of good information about
those utilizing various tax expenditures. Tax returns contain enough
information to detail who claims how much in mortgage interest
deductions and, more recently, the government has begun collecting
information regarding receipts of tax exempt interest. But tax returns
do not provide the government with the identity of the taxpayers
affected by, and thus the amount of tax lost due to, the exclusion of
interest on life insurance savings, exceptions from imputed interest
rules, or most of the employee fringe benefit exclusions. 4 Even the
number assigned to the amount of tax lost to the step-up in the basis
of capital gains at death is questionable, since an accurate
computation requires knowledge of decedents' asset bases-and it is
precisely the government's (or anyone else's) lack of such knowledge
,that justified the repeal of Internal Revenue Code section 1023 in
1978." Similar information deficits exist with respect to other tax
expenditures.
expenditures listed in the official tax expenditure budget with those appropriate using a
comprehensive consumption tax baseline).
47. See Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1169 (Differences in choice of baseline "precludes
the establishment of a uniform, agreed-upon tax expenditure list."). Indeed, differences in
the choice of baseline account for some of the differences between tax expenditure
budgets published by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the U.S. Treasury, discussed
supra note 24. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., supra note 24,

at 107-09 (giving examples).
48. None of this information is required to be reported on individual tax schedules.
See I.R.S. Form 1040, at 1-2 (2002).
49. See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX
L. REV. 413, 487-88 (1982) (discussing role of perceived "unreasonable recordkeeping
burdens" on repeal of section 1023).
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Of course, other sources of information exist which, like tax
returns, can provide a starting point for determining the cost of
various tax expenditures. Estimators use a variety of governmental
databases, ranging from census results to national income and
product accounts, as well as numerous private industry sources." But
extracting the necessary information takes both time and money; and
periodically one hears unsettling rumors regarding the priority (or
lack thereof) accorded preparation of this document by the
chronically overworked Treasury staff. Although the consensus
seems to be that this estimating process has improved over time,51 it
surely remains far from perfect.
Nor do the problems with figures end there.
Because of
interactions between various rules, the amount of tax revenue lost
under the existing tax rules is of only limited value in determining the
effects of modifying or eliminating such rules, the real "cost" of such
provisions. 2 The various tax expenditures often serve as substitutes
for one another; eliminate one and another grows in significance. 3
For example, eliminating the tax preference for state and local bonds
may cause investment to shift from such bonds into housing, another
non-taxable asset. Revenue gains associated with such a rule change
thus may be minimal even though the rule exempting state and local
bond interest from income appears to generate a large revenue loss
on the tax expenditure budget.
In sum, substantial, valid concerns have been raised about the
construction and interpretation of the tax expenditure budget.
Moreover, there is no easy (or even difficult) way to completely
remedy these problems. It would be easy to conclude that the tax
expenditure budget fails at its intended purpose of providing both
government officials and the voting public with information regarding
the government's true priorities, including opportunistic behaviors,
and thus should be abolished. But that conclusion is too simplistic, if
for no other reason than that similar problems afflict other sources of
information on governmental priorities. As the next section points
out, the rest of the federal budget document suffers from equally
serious-and indeed almost identical-problems. If the objections to
the tax expenditure budget warrant its elimination, they would also
warrant ceasing publication of the remainder of the budget.

50. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 26, at 110.
51. Id.

52. This problem is acknowledged in the explanation accompanying the tax
expenditure budget. See 2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 95-96.
53. Again, this was a problem noted by Professor Bittker in 1969. See Bittker, supra
note 4, at 247.
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III. Matching Defects in the Regular Federal Budget
At first glance, the "regular" federal budget, estimating the
amounts to be expended by the government over the next fiscal year,
appears unproblematic. After all, in the absence of government,
there would be no governmental expenditures. Thus, the use of a
zero expenditure baseline as the measure of governmental financial
largesse-and power-makes intuitive sense. Further reflection,
though, reveals that this zero expenditure baseline is as problematic
as the "normal" (or "reference tax") baselines. Nor are the numbers
generated under that baseline particularly trustworthy; large
discrepancies often arise between planned and actual expenditure
levels.-' The closer one looks, the more similar the two types of
budgets-the tax expenditure budget and the regular budgetappear, warts and all.
A. The Baseline Problem in the Regular Budget

Political analysts and ordinary citizens routinely look at the
amounts projected in the budget to be spent on various groups as
evidence of the direction and extent of governmental (warranted and
unwarranted) favoritism. The more money directed at any particular
group, the greater its presumed political influence-a term not to be
confused with social merit.5 For example, the members of the (nonfarming) public generally regard a $100 million increase in payments
to farmers as an indicia of successful "rent-seeking" behavior by that
political group." That is, they view the additional expenditure as a
diversion of $100 million that properly belongs to them or to
governmental programs that they favor to the farm lobby. Further,
many believe that the polity as a whole is worse off as a result of this
transfer either because of the higher tax burden57 or because their
54. The federal budget document includes a comparison of the prior year's estimated
and actual revenue and expenditure totals. The 2001 Budget revealed that the 1999
estimates were off by about $127 billion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 367-71 (2000).

55. The difference between a "socially valuable expenditure" and "socially wasteful
rent-seeking" lies in the eyes of the beholder. Reasonable people can, and frequently do,
disagree over the proper characterization of particular government payments. To a large
extent, such disagreements can be expressed as disagreements over "priorities" discussed
supra note 20.

56. Farmers undoubtedly view such sums as proper recognition of their importance in
society and to the economy. Once again, the distinction between "rent-seeking" and
differing priorities or views of the world is blurry.
57. The tax burden would be higher by an amount in excess of $100 million, since
additional monies must be raised to finance the collection and processing of that $100
million. In addition to the higher extraction, many would contend that they would have
been able to put the money to a better use than the government.
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preferred programs would have generated higher social benefits than
the farm programs actually being financed." Moreover, they may see
such successful transfers as encouraging the further development of
the socially useless lobbying industry." The federal budget, in short,
provides a road-map of contemporary rent-seeking successes, as well
as providing an illustration of the current government's relative
priorities.
But there is less information provided by using a zeroexpenditure baseline than meets the eye. First, the treatment of all
expenditures as evidence of rent-seeking (achieving) understates the
use of the government's taxing power as a mechanism to overcome
collective action and free rider problems. Further, the apparent
beneficiaries of many programs may be quite different from the real,
economic beneficiaries; looking only at who receives the funds may
divert attention from the identity of the real recipients of government
largesse. Each of these problems is discussed below.
Although there would be no government expenditures in the
absence of government, there would be no taxes either. As a result,
individuals and corporations would have more money."' One suspects
that much of this extra money would go towards the purchase of
benefits normally provided at the governmental level. After all, most
people would still want roads, schools, sewer systems and the like.'
This is a long way of making the obvious point that to a large extent,
tax monies are expended to benefit the very people who pay the tax.
The zero expenditure baseline fails to differentiate redistributional
(which may or may not represent rent-seeking, or socially inefficient
pandering to special interests) expenditures from self-financed
benefits, situations in which the government is best viewed as a
neutral stakeholder, the device used to overcome free rider problems
endemic to the provision of public goods. To make political sense of
the information provided by the regular budget, one must
differentiate between expenditures that consist of the return of
particular taxpayers' tax monies in the form of services and those that
result in a net gain to some subgroup of taxpayers, since only the

58. See supra note II (defining "rent-seeking").
59. See id.
60. That is, they would unless (as seems likely) the economy would disintegrate due to

the absence of effective governmental power; anarchy is not generally conducive to
economic growth. The point of this hypothetical is not to praise or condemn the nogovernment world, but to stress an often overlooked aspect of tax payments and receipts.
61. It may well be impossible to get the same level of benefits through market
provision due to free-rider and other collective action problems endemic to the provision
of public goods. Indeed, the need to overcome such problems constitutes a standard
justification for the existence of government. See OLSON, supra note 8, at 100.
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latter could be characterized as the result of "rent-seeking." 2 The
failure to do so is highly misleading, as to both the identity and
amount of potential rent-seeking and priority-setting.
In a sense, this baseline flaw is the converse of the baseline flaw
in the tax expenditure budget. There, the argument goes, the baseline
has been shaped by invisible, and politically contestable, judgments
about a "normal" tax system. In the regular, zero-expenditure
baseline budget, the authors have made no such judgments about a
non-redistributive baseline expenditure pattern, but instead have left
the judgments to readers. Unfortunately, many of those readers,
whether politicians or potential voters, will not realize that such
judgments must be made (let alone how to make them) to
intelligently analyze the information.
Relying on budget numbers can be misleading for another
reason. The actual beneficiaries of federal expenditures may well be
someone other than the apparent beneficiaries. To take an obvious
(and well-known) example, the identity of the primary beneficiary of
Medicare is unclear. Is it the seniors who receive medical care they
might not have received otherwise-or doctors, who now have a
much larger group of paying patients to support their practices? Who
benefits from subsidized federal student loans to medical studentsthe students who take advantage of them, the universities (and their
employees) which rely on the existence of such loan programs when
determining their tuition schedules, or the future patients who gain
from the presence of more doctors? Similar ambiguity exists in the
tax expenditure context. It is, for example, unclear whether the
deduction for home mortgage interest benefits home buyers (the
apparent beneficiaries) or home sellers (who can thereby charge
higher prices for their homes) more.
A reasonable voter's
classification of the expenditure as "rent-seeking," as merely violating
their vision of the public good, or of being good public policy may
differ depending on the "real" beneficiary of the government
expenditure. In all of these cases (and many others), the simple
numbers provided in the federal budget are deceptive, appearing to
convey more information than they actually do.
As with tax expenditures, even if one felt reasonably comfortable
with the operation of the baseline(s), the categorization of particular
expenditures as self-financed benefits, general benefits, or special
benefits, a second, independent reason for suspicion of the document
exists: questions about the accuracy of the numbers put in the various
categories.
62. See sources cited supra note 11 (defining "rent-seeking").

Alternatively, if not

rent-seeking, such expenditures could be analyzed as the outcome of legitimately
contested governmental decisions.
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B. The Numbers

Since the federal budget covers actual expenditures,
expenditures from accounts tracked by federal bureaucrats, one
might think that (at least in relation to the zero baseline) there could
be nothing uncertain, nothing controversial, about the numbers found
in the budget. But one would be wrong, for two reasons. The first is
the interrelationship between various programs, the same sort of
interrelationship that undermines the usefulness of the tax
expenditure budget. The second is the role of entitlement programs.
Just as taxpayers who lose "their" tax expenditures may gravitate
towards investment in other tax-favored activities, individuals
profiting from one governmental program may migrate to another if
their original program is shut down. As a result, the use of a zero
expenditure baseline to score the costs of such programs is
misleading. The real cost is the difference (if any) between the cost of
the program and the cost of the replacement program." For example,
eliminating the Section 8 housing program is unlikely to save the
government the $17.5 billion stated cost of the program' since the
loss of section 8 benefits will cause some of the benefited families to
qualify for other forms of government benefits. Likewise, farm
subsidies-commonly lambasted as the result of pernicious rentseeking, reflecting the excessive electoral power of the farm
interests" 5-are less costly than the zero baseline suggests. If such
subsidies did not exist, at least some of those individuals currently
engaged in farming would exit the profession, undoubtedly damaging
the businesses formerly patronized by them. Perhaps they would
abandon their communities altogether. Though this string of events
may well be efficient (and desirable) in the long run, in the short-run,
the dislocations would be significant and the persons and businesses
affected by it undoubtedly would be partially subsidized by
government aid.
Such aid may come in the form of food, housing and medical
assistance and vocational training programs for displaced farmers and
period; it may come from federal
others in the transitional
contributions to infrastructure projects (such as roads and sewer
systems) necessitated by the consequent demographic shifts. Those
costs could be substantial. One could find similar linkages among
63. Of course, one could make the same objection to all partial equilibrium analyses,
but the point here is surely correct; the tax expenditure budget overstates the revenue loss
attributable to each tax expenditure provision.
64. 2003 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 184.
65. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, How Fiscal "Discipline" Already Bought the Farm,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at A19; Brian M. Riedl, Agriculture Lobby Wins Big in New
Farm Bill, BACKGROUNDER No. 1534 (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 9,2002,
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other programs. Were Medicaid expenditures reduced, leading some
to forgo medical care, one suspects that social security disability
payments would increase as the unmitigated consequences of health
problems drove people from the work force.66 Like the revenue losses
associated with particular tax expenditure provisions on the tax
expenditure budget, the expenditure figures attributed to particular
programs on the federal budget likely overestimate the amount to be
saved through the program's elimination.
Another source of inaccuracy in the federal budget (at least,
viewed prospectively) comes from the fact that not all programs are
funded by a flat dollar amount. Some very large federal programs are
"entitlement" programs; the authorizing statutes guarantee benefits
to all those meeting the programs' qualifications. Entitlement
programs include Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance,
food stamps 67-and the payment of interest on the federal debt, to
name just a few. When constructing the budget, officials estimate the
amount of such expenditures. However, as they are the first to admit,
these estimations depend on the accuracy of economic projections,
projections which often prove inaccurate. 6 Some inaccuracy is
inevitable, given that economics is not an exact science and
unexpected events can intervene. However, politics also can play a
role in deciding upon the underlying economic assumptions. The
party in power often stands accused of picking assumptions to
generate budgetary results in line with its political agenda.6" And
although at year's end, the executive has to publish (as part of the
following year's budget) a comparison of actual to estimated totals,
that does little to separate truly unexpected from predictable
deviations, deviations masked by the party in power to further its
legislative agenda.
C. The Baseline Problem in Equal Outflow/Expenditure Budgets

These limitations of the zero baseline budget have been
implicitly recognized by those who have tried to use another method,
another baseline, to determine whether regions of the country
(including states) have been treated fairly. They compare the tax
revenues collected from each region or state to federal expenditures

66. Similar criticisms have been leveled against the revenue estimates contained in tax
expenditure budgets. See Bartlett, supra note 4, at 417-18; Bittker, supra note 4, at 247.
67. See 2002 BUDGET, supra note 1, at 324.
68. See id. at 4-5.
69. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 54
(rev. ed. 2000) ("The assumptions are where political opportunism and manipulation
thrive.").
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made within the same area.7
The implicit (and often explicit)
assumption is that each region or state should receive its-and only
its-money back in the form of federal expenditures on public
services. When judged against this baseline of equal tax outflows and
expenditure inflows, it appears that some regions and states profit at
the expense of others." Whether the differences in treatment can be
explained by variations in political power and bare-knuckled rentseeking, as some contend,72 or results from social welfare maximizing
decisions is less clear. Indeed, as explained below, this equal inflows
and outflows baseline, like the zero-expenditure baseline, can be
misleading as often as it is helpful even on the narrower issue of
whether any redistribution is occurring.
In the first place, the location of an expenditure may not be a
particularly good proxy for the location of the expenditure's intended
or actual beneficiaries. Thus, the equal tax outflows and expenditure
inflows baseline may underestimate or overestimate the actual match
of tax burdens and government benefits. For example, taxpayers in
the east surely benefit from federal expenditures on western national
parks and forests. 3 They will also benefit from the construction of a
nuclear waste depository in Nevada. Indeed, it would be ludicrous to
contend that the relative "over-financing" of Nevada (relative to New
York) that will result from what promises to be massive federal
expenditures on that repository indicates the success of rent-seeking
behavior by Nevada. 4 More generally, it would seem wrong to imply
that Massachusetts is profiting from rent-seeking merely because
Massachusetts-based companies happen to be the low bidders on an

70. See, e.g., U.S.
STATES:

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
2001, at 312 tbl.470 (2001); HERMAN B. LEONARD & JAY H. WALDER, THE

FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATES: FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 4 tbl.1 (24th ed. 2000); Lynn
A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L.

& POL. 21, 39-40 tbls.2 & 3 (1997).
71. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 70, at 312 ("Each state runs a

balance of payments surplus or deficit with the federal government. Put another way,
each state indirectly subsidizes or is being subsidized by the other states[.]"); Wayne King,
Sun Belt Renews Battle Over Federal Funds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1987, at D19 (learning of

a study showing disparity between federal revenues collected and expended in region, "a
coalition of Southern lawmakers vowed today to wield their legislative power to send
more money southward"); Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Yes, New Yorkers Pick Up Tab for
Other States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at A22.
72. Baker & Dinkin, supra note 70, at 30.

73. But see id. at 41-42 n.63 (arguing federal wealth redistribution to western states
not justified by disproportionate federal ownership of western lands).
74. Nevada's populace and politicians vehemently oppose the construction of a
Nevada depository; however, everyone else is happy to have it located outside their state.
See John J. Fialka, Nuclear-Plant Neighbors Lobby For Yucca, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2002,

at A4.
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inordinately high number of lucrative (or at least expensive) federal
contracts."
This would not be a problem if all states or regions naturally
received approximately the same ratio of generally beneficial
expenditures relative to their tax collections. However, there is no
reason to assume such a convenient state of affairs exists, and some to
suspect it does not.
The location of many general benefit
expenditures are geographically determined. For example, naval
bases have to be built near good harbors on large, navigable bodies of
water. If, for strategic reasons, Congress decides to emphasize
building up the navy rather than the army, coastal states will appear
to benefit in expenditure terms at the expense of inland states. But it
would be unreasonable to treat those facts as evidence of the relative
mistreatment of Iowa unless one is prepared to attack the bona fide
decision to build up the Navy, as opposed to the Air Force.76 Nor
does Iowa have any natural features comparable to those found in
Wyoming, limiting the desirability of federal spending on national
parks in that state. And there appears to be only one Yucca
Mountain.
Another approach would be to amend the tax and expenditure
comparisons by first removing all "general" benefits and associated
tax revenues from the calculations. However, there is no more
prospect of reaching agreement on the list of "general benefits" (let
alone how to allocate the costs of those benefits among states' tax
revenues) than on the list of tax expenditures. 7 Should expenditures
on the space program be regarded as benefiting merely the states in
which related expenditures are made (primarily Florida and Texas,
where the space stations are located), or all states? And what about
farm subsidies, which to many are the archetype rent-seeking success?
A case can be made for the desirability, at a national level, of
maintaining domestic food-producing capacity as a hedge against a
variety of foreign disasters, and farm-state legislators regularly make
it. Nor are they alone in trying to clothe "pork" in the mantle of "the
national interest." Virtually all spending programs are marketed to

75. Unless, of course, one can make a case that letting the contracts in the first
instance resulted from rent-seeking behavior. Such behavior is hardly unknown; it is
widely acknowledged that political rather than military concerns undergird some of the
decisions regarding the purchase of some weapons systems.
76. Of course, if the navy programs could be carried out equally well in any one of
several coastal states, one might expect to see those states engaging in rent-seeking
behavior. See sources cited supra note 11 (defining rent-seeking).
77. See King, supra note 71, at D19 (explaining different outcomes in studies of
regional winners and losers due to differences in analyses used by the Northeast-Midwest
Institute and the Sunbelt Institute).
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Congress and the public as being in the public interest, rather than as
unprincipled grabs on the federal treasury."8
In sum, the problems identified in the tax expenditure budget
have equally serious counterparts in the regular federal budget and its
variants. No budget document provides as much useful information
as one might hope; each is susceptible precisely to the political
manipulation and misinterpretation it is supposed to constrain or
illuminate. Nor is substantial improvement possible. Most of the
identified flaws are inherent in the instruments.
Given these flaws in the information used by members of the
public to inform themselves about the activities of their elected and
appointed officials, the persistence and effectiveness of rent-seeking
behavior (as well as, perhaps, the general phenomenon of voter
apathy) is hardly surprising. Nor can we expect perfection from
political actors acting on the basis of such imperfect information. But
the point of this discussion is not to bemoan the existence of
imperfections in our democratic system. It is instead to put the flaws
inherent in the tax expenditure budget in context. The discussion is
meant to highlight the fact that these flaws are no worse than those
prevailing in another data set that we rely upon to guide our political
analysis and determine our voting patterns, and which no one would
suggest should be eliminated. Having decided that some information
is better than none in that context, to be consistent, we should make
the same decision when it comes to the tax expenditure budget. At
some point, numbers may be so unreliable as to be worthless, but
judging from related contexts, those found in the tax expenditure
budget do not deserve that categorization. And once that point is
accepted, it becomes possible to suggest that the issue should not be
whether the tax expenditure budget device should be retained, but
rather whether we should be adding to the list of imperfect
information devices readily available for public inspection. Is it now
time to require the addition of a "regulatory budget" to the annual
budget publication?
IV. The Case for a Regulatory Budget
The difficulties with composing the tax expenditure budget do
not undercut Surrey's original insights, that subsidies can be delivered
through the tax system as effectively as through direct government
spending, and that intelligent law-making and voting requires taking
both types of subsidies into account. From a recipient's point of view,
it makes no difference whether a government bestows a $1000 check
or excuses the recipient from paying $1000 in taxes by promulgating a
78. See supra note 17.
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favorable tax rule. Instead, the problem with Surrey's analysis was
that it stopped too soon; he should have added government
regulation as an alternative method for delivering $1000 payments to
favored interests. From a recipient's point of view, what matters is
the bottom line: whether it is $1000 richer in the end. The method by
which the $1000 is delivered is irrelevant. At least, it is a matter of
indifference for the recipient; as detailed below, it may make a
substantial difference to the rest of society because the choice of
delivery mechanism may have efficiency effects. It is because of those
effects on society that we should be wary of structuring the political
system to make one delivery mechanism more attractive than the
others.
A. The Substitution Effect
One of the justifications for publication of the tax expenditure
budget was that, in its absence, legislators could grant privileges to
special interest groups without their constituents' knowledge, and
essentially beyond their oversight.79 The argument originally went
further: Surrey believed that legislators were unaware of the benefits
being provided to these special interest groups."0 The hope was that
inclusion of the tax expenditure budget in the federal budget
document would force legislators and the public to scrutinize tax rules
as carefully as direct expenditure provisions, and end what seemed to
be a drift towards increased use of this under-the-table method of
catering to rent-seekers and others.8 ' Although the introduction of
the tax expenditure budget did not markedly succeed in lowering the
growth of tax expenditures,82 tax expenditure provisions now seem to
79. See Forman, supra note 21, at 538 ("Politicians could emphasize the sharply
progressive statutory tax rates when they spoke to average citizens. At the same time they
granted high-income constituents so many special provisions that virtually nobody paid tax
at those high marginal rates."); Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1168 ("[S]uch subsidies,
undisclosed in the federal budget, were not subject to the same scrutiny as direct monetary
expenditures ....).
80. See Surrey, supra note 21, at 730 (addressing tax incentives "not comprehended
within the Government .... No one really knew what was being spent through the tax
system or for what purposes."); Forman, supra note 21, at 541-42 ("[Weidenbaum]
testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic
Committee, in an effort to make Congress aware of the many ways that the government
subsidized the private sector through a variety of off-budget mechanisms.").
81. See Surrey, supra note 21, at 737-38.
82. The baseline problem resurfaces-it is impossible to know to what degree, if at all,
publication of the tax expenditure budget constrained the growth of tax expenditures
because we do not know what would have happened in its absence. However, the
received wisdom is that the budget had at most a limited impact on the continued growth
in tax expenditures. See Forman, supra note 21, at 545 n.67 ("Nevertheless, tax
expenditures continue to grow at a much faster rate than appropriations."); Gene
Steuerle, Some Thoughts on the Status of Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX NOTES 485, 485
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be receiving as much political scrutiny and oversight as direct
spending programs."
But this increase in transparency may not have improved overall
government accountability or manageability.
Transparency with
respect to tax code provisions provides only a glimpse into darkness
so long as regulatory rules are nontransparent. It is possible that, to
the extent the tax expenditure budget has been effective in tempering
at least the most outrageous in interest group grabs 4 in the tax arena,
all it has really succeeded in doing is diverting those efforts to other
subsidy delivery mechanisms subject to less political scrutiny by
legislators and voters. In particular, if a special interest group has
enough political power to obtain a $1000 subsidy, and if obtaining it
through a tax subsidy becomes more difficult as a political matter
because of the publication of the tax expenditure budget, it may go
instead for a favorable regulatory ruling, one which reduces its costs
by $1000. After all, $1000 is $1000, no matter the method of
delivery. Such redirection is plausible because, although many if not
most of regulatory rulings are "public" in the sense that they have to
be published in publicly available agency documents, these
documents are less widely distributed and in less accessible form than
the annual federal budget document. No central compilation of
agency actions and associated costs exists, let alone is published,
distributed and read on an annual basis.
Thus, to the extent the tax expenditure budget has any effect on
the overall level of tax expenditures, it may be redirecting rentseeking rather than reducing its total. And unfortunately for us all, it
is likely that that redirection will make us all worse off. The next
section explains why.

(1995); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 407, 408 (1999) ("Internal Revenue Code ...has apparently become the vehicle of

choice for disbursing government funds."). Nonetheless, the steady chorus of attacks on
the tax expenditure budget leads to the suspicion that it has at least a marginal effect on

behavior.
83. See Zelinsky, supra note 8, at 1194. The mechanisms through which this scrutiny
takes place remain somewhat separate from those overseeing direct expenditures, much to

the discomfort of some analysts who, like Surrey, would prefer a more functionally unified
budgetary process. See, e.g., Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform:
Improving Program Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 789-90 (2000); Thuronyi, supra note 4, at 1192.
84. Such "grabs" may be characterized as "rent-seeking" or contested policy
judgments, depending on one's political proclivities.
85. I do not mean to suggest that such regulatory alternatives are available in all
situations. Indeed, practical and political impediments may make regulatory initiatives
impossible. But as the amount of government regulation increases, so too do the

opportunities for regulatory favoritism. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 8, at
286-87.
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B. Why Redirection Matters
Although all methods of paying $1000 may be equal from the
point of view of the special interest recipient of government largesse,
they may not be equivalent from the perspective of others in the
society, either those who finance the payment or those who are
secondarily affected by the payment. Consider the example of steel
subsidies. In recent years, the steel industry has been in financial
trouble. According to the steel manufacturers, its problems stem
from its inability to charge high enough prices to cover its costs-not
its operating costs, but its fixed costs. The companies claim that
although its operating costs are low enough to survive competition,
they have been hobbled by their obligation to provide medical
benefits to a large cadre of former steelworkers. 6 Those costs could
be "avoided" were the companies to declare bankruptcy, but both
shareholders and former employees would suffer from that course of
action. From the steel industry's point of view having the government
assume those costs is far preferable. 7 But how could those costs be
assumed? Several alternatives exist, each of which has different
social and distributional implications. The government could simply
give the steel companies enough money to pay retiree health costs, or
agree to put those retirees under a federal health insurance plan.
Doing so would spread the cost of the subsidy over all U.S. taxpayers.
So too would a tax expenditure, provided by an exceptionally
generous depreciation rule for steel-making equipment, for example.
By contrast, the imposition of a tariff shifts the burden to consumers
of steel who are forced to pay higher prices for their purchases. Were
the payment made in the form of relaxed environmental rules or
enforcement of existing rules, the payment would come from those
affected by the resulting pollution; it would be exacted in the form of
higher medical costs, and lower or more unpleasant life expectancies.
This raises an obvious fairness issue, as between one burdened group
and another. But beyond the fairness issue is a larger efficiency
concern: the total costs inflicted as a result of either a tariff or a
relaxation of pollution standards may exceed the social costs that
would have been created if Congress paid the desired amount of
86. See Sectoral Trade Disputes: Lumber and Steek Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Fin., 107th Cong. 116-17 (2002) (prepared statement of Thomas J. Usher, Chairman,
CEO and President, U.S. Steel Corp.) ("[T]he American industry is efficient, clean and
world class competitive."). Other commentators are more skeptical of the industry
position that its problems stem from a combination of subsidized, imported steel and
unfunded health care and pension costs. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Parched, Big Steel Goes
to Its Washington Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 3, at 1 (Integrated steel makers'
production costs "remain among the highest in the world.").
87. U.S. Steel doubled its lobbying budget in 2001 hoping to gain such relief. See
Wayne, supra note 86.
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money directly or provided an equivalent amount of tax relief. Both
of these concerns are further elaborated below.
(1) FairnessConcerns
The choice of subsidy mechanism may determine where the
economic burden of the subsidy will be placed. Appearances in this
regard may be deceiving; however, the burden may be reallocated
before the fact, as part of a trade-off in the legislative process, and
after the fact, through the movement of prices and behavior in our
market economy. Thus, the difference between subsidy mechanisms
from a fairness perspective may be more apparent than real; at any
rate, it is more complicated than ordinarily envisioned.
It is tempting to assert that direct expenditures and tax
expenditures distribute costs in the "fairest" fashion. "
Direct
expenditures are paid out of general taxes, which have been collected
from the population based on criteria that have survived the scrutiny
of the political process; a very large part are financed by income taxes
ostensibly levied based on the contributor's (taxpayer's) "ability to
pay." To the extent the need to make such expenditures generates an
increased need for government revenues, those increases will be
financed through agreed upon rate increases levied on the "ability to
pay" base of the federal income tax. Although there are many
disputes about how well the actual income tax system lives up to that
stated goal, no other funding mechanism even attempts to attain that
goal; it would be surprising if they came closer to achieving it.8'
Similarly, when it comes to tax expenditures, to the extent one
analogizes them to subsidies, the same would be true. If one thought
of them solely in terms of their effect in depressing revenues, the
analysis would be virtually the same.
The existence of the
expenditures requires Congress to raise general tax rates to generate
enough revenue to meet the government's spending priorities.
By contrast, regulation imposes burdens on those being
regulated and the parties dealing with them. Raising production costs

88. Here one runs into the ubiquitous baseline problem once again. One cannot
determine the "fairest" method of funding without some underlying conception of what
"fairness" entails. Although some contend that "fairness" requires linking tax burdens to
government benefits, the difficulties involved in determining who benefits from public
goods lead many others to believe that "fairness" requires linking tax burdens to "ability
to pay." The two conceptions of fairness can obviously conflict, although perhaps not as
often as some fear, given that those with relatively high incomes may derive relatively high
benefits from operating within a stable governmental structure. To put the same thought
another way, the government may matter more to a merchant than a subsistence farmer.
89. Although such taxation can be postponed to the future through the expedient of
deficit spending, the money to pay both the interest and principal of the national debt will
likely come from future tax revenues.
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may inflate prices of the goods or services being produced, as well as
depress output. Though in some cases these regulatory costs should
be viewed as leading to the proper internalization of social costs of
production, in other cases the regulation may be over or undercompensatory. For example, critics of the Endangered Species Act
and other land preservation laws routinely argue that it leaves a few
landowners-the last to develop-bearing the cost of an entire
region's habitat loss.9" Likewise, the Americans with Disabilities Act
leaves some employers with quite expensive "accommodation"
responsibilities even in the absence of a causal link between the
employment relationship and an employee's disability. Because these
expenses are discontinuous as between employers, very often the
result is a transfer of wealth from the employer to the employee. "'
However, this broad brush approach likely overstates the
difference between direct payments, tax expenditures, and regulation,
at least under current law. Under the budget procedures now in
effect, Congress and the President do not establish new tax rates each
year based on the desired expenditures for the year. That is, their
baseline reference is not a budget of zero and tax rates of zero. 2
Rather, they start with an overall budgetary target largely based on
the prior year's experience, and try to keep spending within that
range. As a result, whether talking direct expenditures or tax
expenditures, because different proposals compete for the same pot
of funds, the "economic burden" of any particular expenditure item
most properly can be described as falling on the recipients of the
proposal(s) squeezed out (or left un-enacted) to create room for the
programs that are funded. This may always have been true, but it has
become painfully obvious under the current budget procedure.
The current procedure"3 begins with the President; he drafts a
budget which is forwarded to the houses of Congress. 4 There,
90. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 655, 656 (1995) (arguing this feature leads to accelerated development of land);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 346 (1997).
91. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With A Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With DisabilitiesAct?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 307,344-45 (2001).
92. Although such "zero-based-budgeting" has its advocates, it has been rejected

because "these budget processes challenge human limitations, requiring lawmakers to
consider vast numbers of factors in designing programs and allocating resources to them."
Garrett, supra note 44, at 392-93.

93. The current budget process was enacted by the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2

U.S.C. § 601 (2000)). Many of the most noted features of that process, however, were
added by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. See SCHICK, supra note 69, at 23-24 &
fig.2-5 (creating discretionary funding caps and PAYGO rules).
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separate House and Senate budget committees draft budget
resolutions" (which may or may not correspond to the President's
budget)," which are eventually reconciled and passed in the form of a
concurrent resolution. These resolutions set the broad outlines of the
budget by establishing revenue and expenditure targets both for the
federal government as a whole and for a number of different
functional subdivisions of that government.97 The budget is split into
two parts for purposes of these resolutions. The first part covers
discretionary spending programs that receive periodic, usually annual,
appropriations, and the second part covers direct spending programs
and tax provisions that typically remain in effect until repealed.9 The
resolutions set a spending cap for the discretionary portion of the
budget while the direct spending portion is limited by "PAYGO,"
which requires a revenue or direct spending offset for any revenue or
direct spending legislation "that increases the deficit in any fiscal
year." 9
Starting in 1997, the discretionary portion of the budget was
divided further between defense and non-defense expenditures, and
then again into portions that corresponded to the jurisdiction of the
thirteen appropriations subcommittees."")
The appropriate
appropriations subcommittee then decides how to spend the money
allocated to its purview.1
To survive to enactment, a subsidy
proposal must have successfully competed for limited funds against
all other discretionary programs within the jurisdiction of a particular
subcommittee; even before that, the subcommittee must have won the
competition for such funds among all other potential committees and
the discretionary budget as a whole must have been allocated funds at
the expense of the defense budget. Realistically, subsidy proponents
generally have to identify offsetting savings in other discretionary
expenditures; in the words of one commentator, they must adopt the
role of "funding predators."'" 2
The rules for tax expenditures are different in form but similar in
substance. Although the baselines for revenue and expenditure
94. See SCHICK, supra note 69, at 74.
95. See id. at 117.

96. See id. at 105.
97. See id.
98. See Garrett, supra note 44, at 398.
99. See id. at 400.

100. Id. at 398-99.
101. See SCHICK, supra note 69, at 114.

102. See Garrett, supra note 44, at 399-400. "Emergency" spending is exempt from the
caps, and thus from the search for offsetting costs. The lack of criteria or assessments for

designating spending as "emergency" allows it to be used as a "significant loophole." See
SCHICK, supra note 69, at 62. Over the years, Congress has designated many routine and
foreseeable expenditures (such as the cost of the decennial census) as "emergencies." Id.
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amounts are derived from current law rather than artificial spending
caps, supporters of new tax expenditures also have to locate offsets to
meet the PAYGO requirements. Proponents of tax expenditures
appear to have more offset options than did proponents of subsidies.
Because most tax and entitlement measures fall within the purview of
the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, the
offset options available to proponents of new expenditures are not
limited to a subset of programs related loosely by subject matter.'"
Proponents of new tax expenditures for education could try to fund
them by cutting back on favorable agricultural tax provisions.
However, the difference between tax expenditures and subsidies
is less clear than it first appears. Nothing keeps subsidy proponents
from targeting unrelated offset options earlier in the allocation
process. For example, proponents of a new education program could
try to convince members of the budget committees to reduce funds
allocated for agricultural subsidies to allow for an increase in
educational funds. If successful at that level, they would have to
prevail a second time, at the subcommittee level, because they would
have to convince members of the education subcommittee to allocate
those new funds to their particular program. But proponents of tax
expenditures face a similar two-step burden. Supporters of one new
tax expenditure could and did poach offset proposals promulgated by
proponents of another tax expenditure. Thus, it is not enough for
proponents of a particular tax expenditure to successfully target an
offset opportunity; they too have to convince the relevant committee
to dedicate the cost/revenue savings to their cause. It is not unusual
for proponents of a particular tax expenditure to win the first battle
only to see the new funding capacity directed towards a different tax
expenditure.'
Such an outcome obviously makes it harder to obtain
the desired tax expenditure, in that it forces the proponents to come
up with yet another offset suggestion.
Ultimately, both forms of government aid require proponents to
survive challenges by both distant and close competitors in a two-step
process. And, most importantly for these purposes, success comes at
a price in terms of squeezing out some other claimant for government
largesse-a claimant who may lack political clout rather than social
merit, and in any case, is likely to be totally unrelated to the new
beneficiaries. In short, when looking at who really (as opposed to
theoretically) funds direct expenditures and tax expenditures, those

103. See Garrett,supra note 102, at 401.
104. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements
in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 524 (1998) ("[E]ven if a group finds
a weakly defended target to use as an offset, it has no enforceable property rights in its
discovery.").
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sources may not be any more "fair" (in terms of a general "ability to
pay" conception of fairness or in terms of being proper internalizers
of social harms created by an activity) than are the sources "funding"
regulation.
The Senate recently voted to extend these budget rules for six
months beyond their September 30, 2002 expiration date."5 Whether
they remain in place beyond the new March 2003 deadline remains to
be seen. If these rules are replaced, the new budget procedure may
bring the process closer to the more simplified (and presumptively
fair) distribution of costs than the current procedure. Or it may not;
only time will tell whether future budget or tax processes will provide
differential levels of "fairness."
Though at present and perhaps in the future, there might not be
much to choose from on the fairness issue, the same cannot be said
about the efficiency issue. One cannot generalize and say that tax
expenditures or direct spending always creates less deadweight loss
than regulation. However, one can say that generally speaking, the
different funding mechanisms have different behavioral effects,
raising different efficiency concerns. The government should take
these concerns into account when choosing between the different
funding mechanisms. Procedural requirements that "stack the deck"
in favor of one mechanism over another unwisely reduce the impact
of these concerns in the political calculus.
(2) Efficiency Concerns
The deadweight loss associated with tax levies is a well-explored
economic topic." 6 As tax rates rise, taxpayers change their behavior:
switching away from taxable activities (such as work) to non-taxable
activities (such as leisure), reconfiguring their taxable activities to
lower the effective tax rate."" Economists even believe they can
accurately measure the amount of this distortion; they claim that the
However,
deadweight loss equals the square of the tax rateY."
changes in the tax base (as opposed to tax rates) engender different
types of distortions that may not be measured as easily. For example,
the addition of the investment tax credit stimulated capital
investment, often to the detriment of investment in human capital
Tax expenditures function as
and the use of labor generally.
adjustments to the tax base. The precise distortions engendered by
105. Warren Rojas, Senate OKs Six-Month Extension of Budget Enforcement Tools, 97
TAX NOTES 321, 321 (2002).
106. Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the DistortionaryCost of

Taxation, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 513, 513 (1996).
107. Id.
108. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,Doctrine,and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1650-56 & n.122 (1999).
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each depends on the particular features of the tax provision.
Excluding employer-provided health insurance from income, for
example, encourages employer-provided, as opposed to self-provided,
health insurance. ' It may-or may not-increase the total amount of
purchased health insurance, but even if it does, it does so at some cost
in terms of the effects on job mobility and policy design." Regulation
also distorts behavior; indeed, that is usually the point of regulation.
The regulation may be "efficient" or distort behavior in desirable
ways, or do the opposite. Forcing paper mills to install antipollution
equipment raises the cost of producing paper, forcing users of paper
to internalize the cost of the manufacturing process rather than
externalizing it onto those who live in the vicinity-or downstream or
downwind-of the paper mill in the form of ill health and unpleasant
living conditions.
The choice between different funding techniques thus represents
a choice among different forms (and amounts) of distortion.
Consider again the example of subsidies to the steel industry. If the
government's only goal were to provide the steel industry with a
stated sum on money, say $30 million dollars, it could transfer the
sum by writing a check on the federal treasury. It could pay for the
check either through higher taxes (increasing the work/leisure
distortion) or higher debt (perhaps leading to inflation, which would
have its own distorting effects). From the steel industry's point of
view, the money would keep some operations in business that would
have collapsed, to the benefit of their employees and (particularly)
their former employees and shareholders. Or it could enact a tax
expenditure favoring the steel industry-say, specially favorable
depreciation rules for steel-making equipment, which would
encourage steel manufacturers to upgrade their equipment, helping
manufacturers of such equipment and possibly hurting those
employed by or living in the vicinity of some existing steel facilities.
Or it could allow a special deduction for certain types of research or
development expenses that previously had to be capitalized, which in
109. It has been suggested that this tax treatment is responsible for the development of
our current, unsatisfactory system of financing health care. See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, The
Casefor a Tax Credit or Voucher for Providing Health Care to the Nonelderly-Part Four:
The Poor Design of Current Tax Preferences for Employer-Provided Insurance, 52 TAX
NOTES 1219 (1991). Others blame it for causing excessive spending on medical services
and contributing to health care inflation. See, e.g., Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, A New
Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1991);
Martin Feldstein & Bernard Friedman, Tax Subsidies, The Rational Demandfor Insurance
and the Health Care Crisis, 7 J. PUB. ECON. 155, 176 (1977); Louis Kaplow, The Income
Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion
of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1991).
110. See Brian Dowd et al., The Effect of Tax-Exempt Out-of-Pocket Premiums on
Health Plan Choice, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 741, 741-42 (2001).
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addition to conferring benefits to the companies with respect to their
pre-existing research programs would likely lead to an expansion of
those programs at the expense of some other capital projects, such as
equipment upgrades. The current plan provides for a tariff to
encourage domestic steel purchasers to purchase domestically
produced steel. "' The guaranteed market undoubtedly will have
some impact on producers' behavior. It will allow them to charge
higher prices, and perhaps to avoid necessary restructuring in the way
they do business. It will also adversely impact domestic users of steel,
who (if competing against producers from other countries purchasing
steel at lower world prices) may decide to move more of their
operations abroad.' 2 One result of sugar price supports has been the
decimation of the American candy industry."
Domestic steel
workers may save their jobs at the expense of domestic workers in
steel products, just as domestic sugar growers saved theirs at the
expense of domestic candy makers.
Nor are these farm and steel industries isolated examples of
places where the government essentially has a choice of how to
deliver its largesse. Additional scenarios abound. Mining companies
can obtain (and at various points of time, have obtained) government
support through direct subsidies, favorable tax rules, or the
weakening of environmental regulation. So too, have the nation's
railroads, utility producers and a host of manufacturing enterprises.
The point is not that one set of distortions is necessarily smaller
or better than the other (though one might be), only that they are
different and that those differences should be taken into account
when deciding between the alternative courses of action.
If
procedural restrictions make one course of action less attractive than
its alternatives-perhaps because the course is subject to much more
public or even Congressional disclosure than the other-then these
procedural considerations will play a larger role in the political
process and efficiency concerns a correspondingly smaller role. If one
believes that governments should be encouraged to choose the most
efficient methods accomplishing their ends, this seems to be
problematic.
At first blush, this concern suggests that the tax expenditure
budget may be worse than useless. Publishing such a budget focuses
legislative and public attention on (and the concomitant political fallout from) benefits delivered to special interest groups through this
111. David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Tariffs of as Much as 30% on Steel Imports, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6,2002, at Al.
112. Id.
113. David Roeder, Sour Times for Candy Firms, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at 7;
NBC Nightly News: After 35 Years Lifesavers Closing Its Plant in Michigan (NBC
television broadcast, May 31, 2002).
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mechanism. Although the intended effect was to diminish the overall
amount of such payments, it may instead just divert these payments to
another mechanism where they will be less politically visible.
Coupling the questionable effects on the overall amount of interest
group payments with the likelihood of efficiency losses generated by
the need to funnel these payments into a more limited choice of
delivery mechanism suggests that the tax expenditure budget does
more harm than good. But further reflection suggests that this is the
wrong message.
V. Combating Redirection: Regulatory Budgets?
If, in fact, the public exposure created by the creation and
publication of the tax expenditure budget decreases the ability of
special interest groups or minority interests to obtain that form of
governmental favoritism, it may redirect much of the political
pressure to other, less visible-and possibly less efficient-arenas
such as government regulation. Restoration of "information parity"
between tax expenditures and government regulations by eliminating
the tax expenditure budget may well limit some of this redirection.
But the result will still be far from the desired level playing field
between delivery mechanisms because one, government expenditures,
will remain subject to a higher level of public exposure. Indeed, if
one takes the parity argument seriously, one would have to advocate
ceasing publication of the entire federal budget.
There is another alternative. Any level of scrutiny can be
consistent with the goal of achieving parity between the various rentseeking opportunities.
All that is required is that the various
opportunities be subjected to the same level of scrutiny. Instead of
reducing scrutiny of tax expenditures, we could increase opportunities
for public scrutiny of regulation and enforcement decisions. A
concerted effort could be made to more effectively disseminate
information regarding regulatory initiatives, both legislative and
administrative, in a manner similar to or even in conjunction with the
dissemination of information regarding tax and direct expenditures.
Such dissemination would relieve interested members of the public or
their representatives in the press of the burden of tracking down such
information on a bill by bill, regulation by regulation basis."' The
114. Much of the information discussed in the next section already exists, because it is
required to be gathered as part of agency decision-making processes. See supra notes
98-100. Much is already in the public domain. However, it is available in scattered and
sometimes truncated form. One has to know what one is looking for to find it. The same
was true of at least some of the tax expenditure material prior to the early 70's. The
Treasury would provide the information (at least to legislators) upon request; after 1968, a
complete budget could be found in Treasury reports. See sources cited supra note 24.
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General Accounting Office or Office of Management and Budget
could be entrusted with the task of maintaining a central repository of
such information, with lists of the different regulations, their
associated costs and benefits, cross-referenced by affected interest
groups. The annual publication of a "regulatory budget" as part of
the annual budget document would provide Congress and the public
with much more information about the strength of interest groups
than it has now. For example, Congress and the public would have a
much better idea of the power exerted by the oil industry if it could
obtain not only the federal budget and the tax expenditure budget,
but also the effect of rulings by administrative agencies such as
OSHA, the EPA, BLM and the like. But what would such a budget
look like?
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Government regulation, whether imposed by legislation or
agency action, can have profound behavioral consequences, with
concomitant financial impacts. It often shifts costs from one party to
another, or at the very least, changes the form in which those costs
are imposed. For example, anti-pollution rules may impose costs on
manufacturers while benefiting members of the air-breathing, waterdrinking public, who, in the absence of regulation, would have
suffered some combination of filtering, medical and health costs. Of
course, much if not all of the costs imposed on manufacturers may be
passed through to consumers in the form of higher prices for the
products they produce; to the extent those consumers consist of
members of the air-breathing, water-drinking public, the costs will
have shifted only in form-though if the regulation is efficient, the
total of such costs should be somewhat lower as a result of the
regulation. But regulation, like direct expenditures, can be the focus
of rent-seeking, in both directions. Governments can regulate too
much or too little at the behest of special interest groups. The
question is how to tell if-and just as importantly, how to
communicate to the general public when-it is doing either. That is,
on what basis can one monitor regulatory moves in the search for
undue influence?
The desire to come up with a mechanism for monitoring the
activities of administrative agencies is as old as such agencies. In
recent years, most politicians and academics have focused on cost-

And beginning in 1972, the House Ways and Means Committee began publishing those
reports in its committee publications. Id. But proponents of the Tax Expenditure Budget
were not satisfied that this level of disclosure was sufficient and continued to push for its
inclusion in the more widely circulated federal budget document. See supra notes 21-24.
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benefit analysis."5 Some have suggested requiring agencies to publish
on an annual basis, the costs and benefits of regulations put in place

during that year. "' Others have suggested that agencies be granted
annual "budgets" demarcated in terms of costs (or net costs) imposed
by regulation. "7 But while tabulations of the costs and benefits of
regulations may be valuable for some purposes (including serving as
an internal limit on interest group capture"'), they are far from
perfect for purposes of determining the extent of agency influence for
two reasons. One has to do with inherent defects in the construction
of cost-budget analyses; the other is that special interest influence

may be reflected by the absence of regulations, rather than their
existence.
(1) The Numbers, Again

A cost benefit analysis requires the estimation of two numbers:
costs and benefits. Unfortunately for all concerned, such numbers are

often difficult to estimate accurately.
Sometimes the problem lies in the non-monetary nature of
perceived costs and benefits. For example, a substantial literature has
developed over the question of how to value a human life."'
115. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000); Gary S. Becker, A
Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1149 (2000);
Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 323, 323-24 (2001) (cost-benefit analysis generally accepted by Congress,
courts and the executive); Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So
Controversial?,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000); Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the
Cost-Benefit Standard,29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000).
116. There has already been some movement in this direction. The Regulatory
Accountability Provision of 1996 requires the director of the OMB to provide Congress
with estimates of the total annual benefits and costs of all federal regulatory programs as
well as individual regulations; such reports were produced in 1997, 1998 and 2000. Robert
W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 873, 892 (2000); see generally Eric A. Posner, ControllingAgencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2001)
("Bills requiring agencies to use cost-benefit analysis have been routinely proposed in
Congress since 1995. Some federal regulatory statutes already require it and many more
are interpreted to allow it.") (citations omitted).
117. See Eric A. Posner, Using Net Benefit Accounts to Discipline Agencies: A Thought
Experiment, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1473 (2002).
118. See Adler & Posner, supra note 115, at 1141 (cost-benefit analysis "forces agencies
to be clear about the basis of their decisions, and this facilitates monitoring by other
actors"); Becker, supra note 115, at 1152 ("Cost-benefit analysts ... can influence political
outcomes by making enough voters aware of the true effects of different policies.").
119. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 115, at 1141, 1146-47 & app. tbls.A1, A2
(listing different valuations for human life and discount rates used by agencies); John
Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 953 (2000); John D.
Graham & James W. Vaupel, The Value of a Life: What Difference Would It Make?, 1
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Controversies have also arisen over the value of biodiversity, pristine
scenery, and clean air and water. Estimates of costs of compliance
have also proven to be unreliable as the development of new
technology or simply new approaches using old technology often
brings them far below original projections.' 2
Further, one cannot make the comfortable assumption that the
resulting errors will be randomly distributed. The uncertainties
involved in generating these numbers opens opportunities for interest
groups to affect outcomes. In the absence of generally agreed upon
market guidelines, an agency has to rely on expert opinion to
determine the value of costs and benefits. Often, these experts hold
wildly varying opinions; the agency has to decide how to reconcile the
unreconcilable, or choose to pay attention to one and dismiss the
other.'2 ' Allegations of improper influence are far from infrequent
(though generally unproven). But the point remains: an agencyproduced cost-benefit analysis may reflect interest group capture
rather than reveal its existence.
The numbers on their face, then, may be less than revealing of
the desired information. But even if the numbers could be trusted,
any compendium of cost-benefit analyses of adopted regulations
would be a radically incomplete measure of interest group influence
because such influence may take the form of refusing to regulate or
otherwise intervene as well as the actual issuance of rules.
(2) The Non-Interference Alternative
Just as Congress may grant financial favors to a few by not taxing
them, agencies may grant favors by not regulating activities which
"should" be regulated, i.e. where a regulation would be justified if
judged solely on cost-benefit grounds.'22 For example, an agency may
have the power, under the prevailing statute, to forbid a certain
RISK ANALYSIS 89, 89-95 (1981); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843,
845-53 (2000) (describing empirical studies).
120. See Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, in
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER (Jan. 1999), available at
http://www.rff.org/disc-papers/1999.htm (last visited June 24, 2002) (finding that agencies
frequently overestimate costs because of technological innovations). Indeed, very early
on, scholars suggested adopting "technology-forcing" regulations that would spur the
development of cost-reducing technologies. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
121. See Posner, supra note 117, at 1146 ("[Tlhe intangibles are significant enough to
leave the agency with wide discretion.").
122. See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on
Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 284-85, 291-92, 312 (1990). One prominent
empirical study suggests that interest groups are particularly effective in blocking
government action. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 314-15,395-96,398 (1986).
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mining technique on grounds that it pollutes watersheds, and, because
of interest group pressure, decide not to issue such a regulation thus
But a
allowing the destructive mining process to proceed.
compendium of the costs and benefits of regulations that have been
Nor,
issued would completely miss that type of favoritism.
unfortunately, can one simply publish a table outlining the differences
between the "socially optimum" set of regulations and those actually
in force (or enacted in a given year) since the definition of that social
optimum would be controversial, to say the least. Finally, the
compilation or publication of differences between U.S. and foreign
regulations in a given area would not necessarily be helpful, inasmuch
as the foreign regulations may themselves have been influenced by
(the same or different) interest group concerns.
These criticisms of a unified cost-benefit analysis schedule are
strongly reminiscent of those leveled in earlier parts of this paper
about the current federal budget document. The pervasive nature of
the baseline and measurement problems cannot be denied. On the
other hand, it is hard to believe that having this information readily
available would make the American press or public (or even
legislators) less knowledgeable about the role played by
governmental institutions and less adequate to play their role in the
governing process.'23 The real question is whether this information is
enough. It may well be desirable to gain a second perspective on
agency action, one which focuses as much on agency inaction as
positive action. Just as the tax expenditure budget points out the
significance of "negative collections" by the government, the "contact
audit" described in the next section may shed some light on the
phenomenon of "negative regulation," or decisions by agencies not to
regulate.
B. The Contact Audit

Coming up with a way to intelligibly present information about
the influence of interest groups on agency actions is important
because it has the potential for reducing the total amount of rentseeking, ensuring the efficient delivery of that which persists, and
informing the public about the content of government action in
general. Standard tools for monitoring agency actions, however, are
Another
only partially successful in accomplishing this goal.

123. In one respect, the information conveyed by a cost-benefit budget would be more

complete and potentially more useful than that conveyed by either the expenditure or taxexpenditure budget. Neither of those documents attempts to quantify the benefits of the
government largesse being disclosed. A comparable regulatory budget would include only
regulatory costs. It may be worth considering whether deviating from a parallel structure

in the regulatory context affects regulatory incentives.
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approach may be helpful. One such approach is suggested by the
recent controversy regarding energy industry input into the energy'
deregulation rules: the "contact audit" or "contact schedule.""'
Agencies could be required to report the identity/affiliation, number
and extent (perhaps measured by time) of contacts with nongovernmental representatives with respect to every regulatory
procedure, whether it culminated in the issuance of a regulation or
not. A report card could then be constructed for each such agency
action (or inaction), containing the number of such contacts and the
interests they represented. At the very least, such lists would reveal
the extent of special interest concern about an issue; at best, it may
encourage agencies to seek out alternative viewpoints to avoid the
embarrassment of appearing to make one-sided decisions-and
having heard those viewpoints, to make better decisions.
Requiring the construction and publication of such schedules
would not be without problems. Deciding which members of the
agency and which contacts should be reported would be problematic.
One would have to balance fears about routine avoidance of
reporting requirements with workload concerns-to say nothing of
the possibilities for obscuring information about substantive contacts
by camouflaging them in a host of routine transactions. For example,
if contacts only had to be recorded after the initiation of a regulatory
procedure, it would not be surprising to see the formal initiation of
such procedures delayed until the agency was farther along in its
deliberative process."
Alternatively, lobbyists might attempt to
influence Congressional officials or staff members, both as to
underlying substance and also the need to lean on agency personnel.
Such indirect influence may leave few obvious fingerprints. And to
the extent the contact audit is effective in collecting and promulgating
relevant information, one would have to accept the possibility that
the information may be used to increase interest group power, by

124. Vice-President Cheney chaired an energy tax force entrusted with the task of
crafting the executive's energy deregulation policy. After the financial collapse of
Enron-one of the major players in the energy and energy-trading market-amid
allegations of fraud and malfeasance, both the General Accounting Office and Congress
attempted to get information regarding contacts between Cheney, Enron and other energy
industry officials. The administration initially refused to provide this information,
claiming executive privilege. After the GAO filed suit to obtain the list of witnesses
appearing before the energy tax force and a Senate committee subpoenaed records of
contacts between Enron and the White House, the information was released. See Eric
Herman, Government Releases Enron Info, White House Acts Hours After Senate
Subpoenas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 23,2002, at 67.
125. See Elizabeth Garrett, Interest Groups and Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 137, 139 (2000) ("Lawmakers and other political players.., can seek to
manipulate rules and procedures so that they do not operate as roadblocks.").
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enabling group members to better monitor attempts
at free-riding
26
and other forms of misbehavior by each other.'
Further, the information provided would be less than a perfect
proxy for interest group capture:
many instances of one-sided
representation could be explained as reflecting the fact that some
would be helped but no one would be hurt by the adoption (or nonpromulgation) of the rule under consideration. And special interests
may prevail even in a hard-fought situation, where many opponents
had their say.
However, one can hope that it will forestall
inadvertent, "stealth" catering to special interests out of ignorance
created by one-sided information gathering.
Once again, the problems detailed above resemble quite closely
the problems identified in the direct expenditure and tax expenditure
(and cost benefit analysis) budgets. What we learned from those
contexts should be carried over to this one: we should not let
yearning for what we cannot have stand in the way of reaching for the
best of what is available. When deciding whether information should
be provided to the public, the ultimate question is whether the
information would, on balance, improve governmental (and voter)
decisionmaking. And we should apply the same standards to all the
various information sources.
Both baseline and measurement problems are ubiquitous. We
long ago decided that they should not stand in the way of publishing
the zero-expenditure baseline budget. A similar decision was made
with respect to the tax expenditure budget almost thirty years ago,
and should be reaffirmed. It is time to do the same for both a unified
cost-benefit schedule and a contact audit. Pairing the two will give
readers an idea both of major agency actions and decisions not to act,
just as we currently provide information about spending that takes
place directly and indirectly, by forgoing tax collections. Although
providing such schedules in the federal budget document will not
guarantee that all legislators, let alone all voters, internalize and fully
digest the limited implications of this material, it will make
governmental decisions somewhat more transparent. It would be a
step in the right direction.
Conclusion
Monitoring requires information about the subject being
monitored.
And no one would dispute that using perfect
information-perfectly
accurate, perfectly complete-in
the
monitoring process is the ideal. But like all ideals, this one is often

126. See id. at 140 ("Ironically, maximizing opportunities for participation has also
maximized the opportunity for strategic behavior.") (citation omitted).
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impossible to attain. To avoid paralysis, people are forced to rely on
incomplete information. This does not mean that they should treat
the information they receive as perfect. Indeed, knowledge of the
shortcomings of one's information stream can be a critical factor in
decision making. It justifies leaving open the possibility of altering
behavior as additional information becomes available, or
compensating for systemic skews in the information stream. This is as
true in the budget context as in any other. None of the current
sources of information is perfect. But the response should not be to
ignore the information that is available. It defies belief that
politicians would be better behaved (i.e. engage in less rent-seeking
behavior) if the budget or the tax expenditure budget were kept
secret, or made available to the public in a less digestible form. The
solution is to try to make those sources of information better, either
by changing them or by supplementing them with other sources of
information.
This Article suggests two candidates for such
supplementation, both aimed at an obvious substitute for behavior
which the publication of the current budget and tax expenditure
budget is aimed at exposing to public view. Like the budgets that
preceded it, the cost-benefit schedule and contact audits will not
provide perfect information. But by improving transparency, they
should provide voters with better information than they now have. It
is perhaps more academic and much cleaner to criticize all devices
that build on artificially constructed baselines, but it is more useful to
think of ways in which we can improve real decisionmaking and
monitoring processes.

